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Abstract. We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable util-
ities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicographic
preferences, we characterize the set of strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and
show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the
only mechanisms satisfying these properties. Dropping the neutrality requirement, this class of
quota mechanisms further expands to sequential dictatorship quota mechanisms. We then extend
quota mechanisms to randomized settings, and show that the random serial dictatorship quota
mechanisms (RSDQ) are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents
and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD)
satisfies envyfreeness when preferences are lexicographic.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents without any explicit market. In
many real-life domains such as course assignment, room assignment, school choice, medical resource
allocation, etc. the use of monetary transfers or explicit markets are forbidden because of ethical and legal
issues.Much of the literature in this domain is concerned with designing incentive compatible mechanisms
that incentivizes agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Moreover, the criterion of Pareto efficiency
along with strategyproofness provide stable solutions to such allocation problems.
We are interested in allocation problems where each agent may receive a set of objects and thus we
search for mechanisms that satisfy some core axiomatic properties of strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency,
and non-bossiness. Examples of such allocation problems include distributing inheritance among heirs3,
allocating multiple tasks to employees, assigning scientific equipment to researchers, assigning teaching
assistants to different courses, and allocating players to sports teams. The common solution for allocating
players to teams or allocating courses to students in the course assignment problem is the Draft mecha-
nism [7], where agents choose one item in each picking round. However, allocation mechanisms, such as
the Draft mechanism, have been shown to be highly manipulable in practice and fail to guarantee Pareto
optimality [9].
Svensson [36,37] formulated the standard assignment problem (first proposed by Shapley and Scarf [35])
where each agent receives exactly one item, and showed that Serial Dictatorship mechanisms are the only
social choice rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategyproofness, non-bossiness, and neutrality. In con-
trast to the standard assignment problem, in the multiple assignment problem agents may require bundles
or sets of objects according to a predefined quota and might have various interesting preferences (e.g.
complements or substitutes) over these sets. However, the class of sequential dictatorships mechanisms
no longer characterizes all non-bossy, Pareto efficient, and strategyproof social choice mechanisms. To
address this issue, Pa´pai [28] and Hatfield [18] studied the multiple assignment problem where objects
are assigned to agents subject to a quota. Pa´pai [28] showed that under quantity-monotonic preferences
every strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto efficient social choice mechanism is sequential; while general-
izing to monotonic preferences, the class of such social choice functions gets restricted to quasi-dictatorial
mechanisms where every agent except the first dictator is limited to pick at most one object. Pa´pai’s char-
acterization is essentially a negative result and rules out the possibility of designing neutral, non-bossy,
strategyproof, and Pareto efficient mechanisms that are not strongly dictatorial. Hatfield [18], on the
other hand, addressed this issue by assuming that all agents have precisely fixed and equal quotas, and
3 Here we only consider non-liquid assets that cannot be quickly or easily converted to transferable assets such
as money.
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showed that serial dictatorship is strategyproof, Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and neutral for responsive
preferences.
Our work generalizes these results, for a subclass of preferences, by allowing any number of agents
or objects, and assuming that individual agents’ quotas can vary and be agent specific, imposing no
restrictions on the problem size nor quota structures. Instead, we are interested in expanding the possible
quota mechanisms to a larger class, essentially enabling a social planner to choose any type of quota
system based on a desired metric such as seniority. Our main focus is on the lexicographic preference
domain, where agents have idiosyncratic private preferences.
Lexicographic preferences [15] have recently attracted attention among researchers in economics and
computer science [25, 32, 34]. In behavioral economics and psychology as well as consumer market re-
search, there is evidence for the presence of lexicographic preferences among individuals such as breaking
ties among equally valued alternatives [13], making purchasing decisions by consumers [11], and exam-
ining public policies, job candidates, etc. [38]. Choice and decisions are particularly tend to look more
lexicographic in ordinal domains, thus, in ordinal mechanism design one must pay particular attention
to the settings wherein agents may treat alternatives as non-substitutable goods.
Our main results in the lexicographic preference domain are the following:
– We characterize the set of strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral allocation mechanisms when there
is a quota system. We show that serial dictatorships are the only mechanisms satisfying our re-
quired properties of strategyproofness, non-bossiness, Pareto efficiency, and neutrality. Allowing any
quota system enables the social planner to remedy the inherent unfairness in deterministic allocation
mechanisms by assigning quotas according to some fairness criteria (such as seniority, priority, etc.).
– We generalize our findings to randomized mechanisms and show that random serial dictatorship quota
mechanisms (RSDQ) satisfy strategyproofness, ex post efficiency, and envyfreeness in the domain of
lexicographic preferences. Consequently, we prove that the well-known Random Serial Dictatorship
(RSD) mechanism in standard assignment settings satisfies envyfreeness when preferences are lexico-
graphic. Thus, random quota mechanisms provide a rich and extended class for object allocation with
no restriction on the market size nor quota structure while providing envyfreeness in the lexicographic
domains, justifying the use of such mechanisms in many practical applications.
2 Related Work
In the standard assignment problem (sometimes known as the house allocation problem), each agent
is entitled to receive exactly one object from the market. Pa´pai [27] extended the standard model of
Svensson [36, 37] to settings where there are potentially more objects than agents (each agent receiving
at most one object) with a hierarchy of endowments, generalizing Gale’s top trading cycle procedure.
This result showed that the hierarchical exchange rules characterize the set of all Pareto efficient, group-
strategyproof, and reallocation proof mechanisms. In the multiple-assignment problem, agents may re-
ceive sets of objects, and thus, might have various interesting preferences over the bundles of objects.
Pa´pai [29] studied this problem on the domain of strict preferences allowing for complements and substi-
tutes, and showed that sequential dictatorships are the only strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and non-bossy
mechanisms. Ehlers and Klaus [14] restricted attention to responsive and separable preferences and es-
sentially proved that the same result persists even in a more restrictive setting. Furthermore, Ehlers
and Klaus showed that considering resource monotonic allocation rules, where changing the available
resources (objects) affects all agents similarly, limits the allocation mechanisms to serial dictatorships.
Hylland and Zeckhauser’s pseudo-market design based on eliciting cardinal utilities [20] and its deter-
ministic counterpart based on competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI)provide efficient and
envyfree solutions but are highly susceptible to manipulation. Zhou [41], based on Gale’s conjecture [16],
proved that there do not exist (randomized) allocation rules that satisfy symmetry, Pareto efficiency,
and strategyproofness.
In the randomized settings, Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS) are
well-known for their prominent economic properties. RSD satisfies strategyproofness, ex post efficiency,
and equal treatment of equals [1], while PS is ordinally efficient and envyfree but not strategyproof [4].
For divisible objects, Schulman and Vazirani [34] showed that if agents have lexicographic preferences, the
Probabilistic Serial rule is strategyproof under strict conditions over the minimum available quantity of
objects and the maximum demand request of agents. Under indivisible objects, these strict requirements
translate to situations where the number of agents is greater than the number of objects and each
agent receives at most one object. When allocating multiple objects to agents, Kojima [26] obtained
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negative results on (weak) strategyproofness of PS in the general domain of preferences. Not only PS is
not strategyproof, but the fraction of manipulable profiles quickly goes to one as the number of objects
exceeds that of agents, even under lexicographic preferences [19]. In contrast, we seek to find strategyproof
and envyfree mechanisms with no restriction on the number of agents or objects under the lexicographic
preference domain, addressing the open questions in [28] and in [34] about the existence of a mechanism
with more favorable fairness and strategyproofness properties.
3 The Model
There is a set of m indivisible objects M = {1, . . . ,m} and a set of n agents N = {1, . . . , n}. There is
only one copy of each object available, and an agent may receive more than one object. Let M = P(M)
denote the power set of M .
Agents have private preferences over sets of objects. Let P denote the set of all complete and strict
preferences overM. Each agent’s preference is assumed to be a strict relation ≻i∈ P . A preference profile
denotes a preference ordering for each agent and is written as ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Pn. Following the
convention, ≻−i= (≻1, . . . ,≻i−1,≻i+1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Pn, and thus ≻= (≻i,≻−i).
An allocation is a n×m matrix A ∈ A that specifies a (possibly probabilistic) allocation of objects
to agents. The vector Ai = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,m) denotes the allocation of agent i, that is,
A =


A1
A2
...
An

 =


A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,m
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,m
...
...
. . .
...
An,1 An,2 . . . An,m


We sometimes abuse the notation and use Ai to refer to the set of objects allocated to agent i. Let
A refer to the set of possible allocations. Allocation A ∈ A is said to be feasible if and only if ∀j ∈
M,
∑
i∈N Ai,j = {0, 1}, no single object is assigned to more than one agent, while some objects may not
be assigned. Note that we allow free disposal, and therefore,
⋃
i∈N Ai ⊆M . For two allocations we write
Ai ≻i Bi if agent i with preferences ≻i strictly prefers Ai to Bi. Thus, Ai i Bi and Bi i Ai implies
Ai = Bi.
Preference ≻i is lexicographic if there exists an ordering of objects, (a, b, c, . . .), such that for all
A,B ∈ A if a ∈ Ai and a /∈ Bi then Ai ≻i Bi; if b ∈ Ai and a, b /∈ Bi then Ai ≻i Bi; and so on. That is,
the ranking of objects determines the ordering of the sets of objects in a lexicographic manner. Note that
lexicographic preferences are responsive and strongly monotonic. A preference relation is responsive if
Ai
⋃
Bi ≻i Ai
⋃
B′i if and only if Bi ≻i B
′
i. Strong monotonicity means that any set of objects is strictly
preferred to all of its proper subsets. We make no further assumption over preference relations.
An allocation mechanism is a function π : Pn → A, which assigns a feasible allocation to every
preference profile. Thus, agent i’s allocation Ai can also be represented as πi. An allocation mechanism
assigns objects to agents according to a quota system q, where qi is the quota of the ith dictator such
that
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ m. Since in our model not all agents need to be assigned an object, we use the size of
quota |q| to denote the number of agents that are assigned at least one object. Thus, we have |q| ≤ n.
From the revelation principle [12], we can restrict our analysis to direct mechanisms that ask agents to
report their preferences to the mechanism directly.
3.1 Properties
In the context of deterministic assignments, an allocation A Pareto dominates another allocation B at
≻ if ∃i ∈ N such that Ai ≻i Bi and ∀j ∈ N Aj j Bj . An allocation is Pareto efficient at ≻ if no other
allocation exists that Pareto dominates it at ≻. Since a social planner may decide to only assign C ≤ m
number of objects, we need to slightly modify our efficiency definition. We say that an allocation that
assigns C =
∑n
i=1 qi objects is Pareto C-efficient if there exists no other allocation that assigns an equal
number of objects, C, that makes at least one agent strictly better off without making any other agent
worse off. A Pareto C-efficient allocation is also Pareto efficient when
∑n
i=1 qi = m.
Definition 1 (Pareto C-efficiency). A mechanism π with quota q, where C =
∑
i qi, is Pareto C-
efficient if for all ≻∈ Pn, there does not exist A ∈ A which assigns C objects such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ai i πi(≻), and Aj ≻j πj(≻) for some j ∈ N .
A mechanism is strategyproof if there exists no non-truthful preference ordering ≻′i 6=≻i that improves
agent i’s allocation. More formally,
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Definition 2 (Strategyproofness). Mechanism π is strategyproof if for all ≻∈ Pn, i ∈ N , and for
any misreport ≻′i∈ P, we have πi(≻) i πi(≻
′
i,≻−i).
Although strategyproofness ensures that no agent can benefit from misreporting preferences, it does
not prevent an agent from reporting a preference that changes the prescribed allocation for some other
agents while keeping her allocation unchanged. This property was first proposed by Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein [33]. A mechanism is non-bossy if an agent cannot change the allocation without changing
the allocation for herself.
Definition 3 (Non-bossiness). A mechanism is non-bossy if for all ≻∈ Pn and agent i ∈ N , for all
≻′i such that πi(≻) = πi(≻
′
i,≻−i) we have π(≻) = π(≻
′
i,≻−i).
Non-bossiness and strategyproofness only prevent certain types of manipulation; changing another
agent’s allocation or individually benefiting from a strategic report. However, it may still be possible
for two or more agents to form a coalition and affect the final outcome, so that at least one of them
improves her allocation ex post. This requirement is called group-strategyproofness, which precludes
group manipulation as well as individual agent manipulation.
Our last requirement is neutrality. Let φ : M → M be a permutation of the objects. For all A ∈ A,
let φ(A) be the set of objects in A renamed according to φ. Thus, φ(A) = (φ(A1), . . . , φ(An)). For each
≻∈ Pn we also define φ(≻) = (φ(≻1), . . . , φ(≻n)) as the preference profile where all objects are renamed
according to φ.
Definition 4 (Neutrality). A mechanism π is neutral if for any permutation function φ and for all
preference profiles ≻∈ Pn, φ(π(≻)) = π(φ(≻)).
In other words, a mechanism is neutral if it does not depend on the name of the objects, that is,
changing the name of some objects results in a one-to-one identical change in the outcome. It is clear
that above conditions reduce the set of possible mechanisms drastically.
4 Allocation Mechanisms
Several plausible multiple allocation mechanisms exploit interleaving picking orders to incorporate some
level of fairness, where agents can take turns each time picking one or more objects [6, 8, 24]. An inter-
leaving mechanism alternates between agents, allowing a single agent to pick objects in various turns.
The interleaving mechanisms have been widely used in many everyday life activities such as assigning
students to courses, members to teams, and in allocating resources or moving turns in boardgames or
sport games. To name a few, strict alternation where agents pick objects in alternation (e.g. 1212 and
123123) and balanced alternation where the picking orders are mirrored (e.g. agent orderings 1221 and
123321), and the well-known Draft mechanism [7–9] that randomly chooses a priority ordering over n
agents and then alternates over the drawn priority ordering and its reverse sequence are the examples
of such mechanisms. However, all these interleaving mechanisms are highly manipulable in theory; com-
puting optimal manipulations under interleaving mechanisms is shown to be easy only for two agents
under additive and separable preferences and similarly for lexicographic preferences [2]. Extending to
non-separable preferences, deciding a strategic picking strategy is NP-complete, even for two agents [5].
Kalinowski et al. [22] studied interleaving mechanisms (alternating policies) from a game-theoretical
perspective and showed that under linear order preferences the underlying equilibrium in a two-person
picking game is incentive compatible [23]. Nonetheless, such interleaving mechanisms have been shown
to be heavily manipulated in practice [9].
Before discussing the main characterization results, here we provide a formal statement for all inter-
leaving mechanisms. We generalize such allocation procedures to any mechanism with an interleaving
order of agents with general preferences where at least one agent gets to choose twice, once before and
once after one (or more) agents. We note that all missing proofs can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 1. There exists no interleaving mechanism that satisfies Pareto C-efficiency, non-bossiness,
and strategyproofness.
Clearly, an imposed mechanism that assigns a fixed allocation to every preference profile is strat-
egyproof and non-bossy but does not satisfy Pareto C-efficiency [29].4 With these essentially negative
results for interleaving mechanisms, we restrict our attention to the class of sequential dictatorship
mechanisms, where each agent only gets one chance to pick (possibly more than one) objects.
4 An imposed mechanism does not take agents’ preferences into account and prescribes the same allocation to
every preference profile.
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4.1 Sequential Mechanisms
Let q denote a quota system such that
∑
i qi ≤ m. In a sequential dictatorship mechanism with quota
q, the first dictator chooses q1 of her most preferred objects; the second dictator is chosen depending on
the set of objects allocated to the first dictator. The second dictator then chooses q2 objects of her most
preferred objects among the remaining objects. This procedure continues, where the choice of the next
dictator may be determined based on the earlier allocations, until no object or no agent is left.
Let f be a function that, given a partial allocation of objects to some agents, returns the next dictator.
Then, fi(·) = j means that agent j is ranked ith in the ordering of dictators. There exists an agent f1
(first dictator) for each preference profile ≻∈ M, and an ordering of the remaining dictators such that
the ith dictator is identified recursively by
fi(πf1 (≻), . . . , πfi−1 (≻))
In other words, the choice of the next dictator only depends on the previous dictators and their allocation
sets and does not depend on the preferences of the previous dictators. The following example shows why
the choice of dictator should not depend on previous dictators’ preferences.
Example 1. Assume three agents and four objects with q = (2, 1, 1) and consider the following rule for
identifying the order of the dictators: if the first dictator’s preference is a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d then the ordering
of other agents is (2,3), otherwise the order is (3,2). Now if agent 2 and 3 have identical preferences as
agent 1, then agent 1 can simply change agent 2 and 3’s allocations by misrepresenting her preference as
≻ˆ1 : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d while her allocation remains unchanged. Thus, this sequential dictatorship mechanism
is bossy even though it satisfies Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness.
Definition 5 (Sequential Dictatorship). Let Mk = P≤k(M) be the set of subsets of M of cardinality
less than or equal k. An allocation mechanism π : Pn → A is a sequential dictatorship quota mechanism
if there exists a quota system q and an ordering f such that for all ≻∈ Pn,
πf1(≻) ={Z ∈ Mq1 |Z ≻1 Z
′ for all Z ′ ∈Mq1}
πfi(πf1 ,...,πfi−1)(≻) ={Z ∈ Mqi \
j=i−1⋃
j=1
πfj (≻)|Z ≻fi Z
′ for all |Z ′| = |qi|}
A serial dictatorship mechanism is an example of a sequential mechanism where the ordering is a
permutation of the agents, determined a priori, that is, for all≻∈ Pn, πf(·)(≻) = πf (≻). Such mechanisms
satisfy neutrality. From now on, we simply use the vector f instead of f(·) when the ordering is predefined
independent of the choice of objects.
5 Serial Dictatorship Quota Mechanisms
In this section, we study serial dictatorship mechanisms for quota allocations and characterize the set of
strategyproof, non-bossy, neutral, and Pareto efficient mechanisms subject to various quota systems.
When allocating objects sequentially via a quota system q, Pareto C-efficiency requires that no two
agents be envious of each others’ allocations since then they can simply exchange objects ex post, implying
that the initial allocation is dominated by the new allocation after the exchange. For example, take a
serial dictatorship with q1 = 1 and q2 = 2 and three objects. Agent 1 will receive her top choice object
{a} (since {a} ≻1 {b} ≻1 {c}) according to her preference and agent 2 receives {b, c}. However, it may
be the case that {b, c} ≻1 {a} while {a} ≻2 {b, c} and both agents may be better off exchanging their
allocations. Thus, we have the following proposition for general preferences.
Proposition 1. For general preferences, sequential (and serial) dictatorship quota mechanisms do not
guarantee Pareto C-efficiency.
In the absence of Pareto C-efficiency in the domain of general preferences, a social planner is restricted
to use only one type of quota system; either assigning at most one object to all agents except the first
dictator (who receives the remaining objects), or setting equal quotas for all agents [18, 28].
Due to the impossibility shown in Proposition 1, we restrict ourselves to the interesting class of
lexicographic preferences. We show that if preferences are lexicographic, regardless of the selected quota
system, any serial dictatorship mechanism guarantees Pareto C-efficiency. We first provide the following
lemma in the lexicographic domain.
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Lemma 1. The following statements hold for two sets of objects when preferences are lexicographic:
- If Bi ⊂ Ai then Ai ≻i Bi.
- For all X such that X ∩ Ai = ∅, we have Ai ≻i Bi iff Ai ∪X ≻i Bi ∪X.
- If Bi 6⊂ Ai and Ai ≻i Bi then there exists an object x ∈ Ai such that x ≻i X for all X ∈ P(Bi−Ai).
Proposition 2. If preferences are lexicographic, the serial dictatorship quota mechanism is Pareto C-
efficient.
Proof. Consider a mechanism π with quota q, that assigns C =
∑
i qi objects. Suppose for contradiction
that there exists an allocation B with arbitrary quota q′, where C′ =
∑
i q
′
i, that Pareto dominates
A = π(≻). We assume C′ = C to ensure that both allocations assign equal number of objects (Otherwise
by strong monotonicity of lexicographic preferences and Lemma 1 one can assign more objects to strictly
improve some agents’ allocations.).
Thus, for all agents j ∈ N , Bj j Aj , and there exist some agent i where Bi ≻i Ai. If for all j ∈ N ,
|Bj | ≥ |Aj | then q′j ≥ qj . Now suppose for some i, |Bi| > |Ai|. This implies that q
′
i > qi. By adding these
inequalities for all agents we have
∑
i q
′
i >
∑
i qi, contradicting the initial assumption of equal quota
sizes (C′ = C).
For the rest of the proof, we consider two cases; one where the size of Bi is greater than that of Ai,
i.e., |Bi| > |Ai|, and one where |Bi| ≤ |Ai|.
Case I: Consider |Bi| ≤ |Ai| and Bi ≻i Ai. If Bi ⊂ Ai then monotonicity of lexicographic preferences
in Lemma 1 implies that Ai ≻i Bi contradicting the assumption. On the other hand, if Bi 6⊂ Ai by
Lemma 1 there exists an object x ∈ Bi such that for all X ∈ P(Bi−Ai) agent i ranks it higher than any
other subset, that is, x ≻i X . In this case, serial dictatorship must also assign x to agent i in Ai, which
is a contradiction.
Case II: Consider |Bi| > |Ai| and Bi ≻i Ai. The proof of this case heavily relies on the lexicographic
nature of preferences (as opposed to Case I that held valid for the class of monotonic, and not necessarily
lexicographic, preferences). The inequality |Bi| > |Ai| indicates that q
′
i > qi. We construct a preference
profile ≻′ as follows: for each j ∈ N , if Bj = Aj then ≻′j=≻j, otherwise if Bj 6= Aj rank the set Bj
higher than Aj in ≻′j (≻
′
j= Bj ≻ Aj ≻ . . .). Now run the serial dictatorship on ≻
′ with quota q. Suppose
that B′ = π(≻′). For agent i, B′i is the top qi objects of Bi where B
′
i ( Bi and because qi is fixed,
then |B′i| = |Ai|. Given ≻
′ we have Bi 6= Ai, which implies that B′i 6= Ai. By strong monotonicity for
agent i we have Bi ≻i B′i ≻i Ai. However, according to the constructed quotas we have |Bi| > |B
′
i| but
|B′i| = |Ai|, where B
′
i 6= Ai. By Lemma 1 there exists an object x ∈ B
′
i which is preferred to all proper
subsets of Ai−Bi. However, if such object exists it should have been picked by agent i in the first place,
which is in contradiction with agent i’s preference. ⊓⊔
We state a few preliminary lemmas before proving our main result in characterizing the set of non-
bossy, Pareto C-efficient, neutral, and strategyproof mechanisms. Given a non-bossy and strategyproof
mechanism, an agent’s allocation is only affected by her predecessor dictators. Thus, an agent’s allocation
may only change if the preferences of one (or more) agent with higher priority changes.
Lemma 2. Take any non-bossy and strategyproof mechanism π. Given two preference profiles ≻,≻′∈ Pn
where ≻= (≻i,≻−i) and ≻′= (≻i,≻′−i), if for all j < i we have πfj (≻) = πfj (≻
′), then πfi(≻) = πfi(≻
′).
The next Lemma guarantees that the outcome of a strategyproof and non-bossy mechanism only
changes when an agent states that some set of objects that are less preferred to πi(≻) under ≻i is now
preferred under ≻′i. Intuitively, any preference ordering ≻
′
i which reorders only the sets of objects that
are preferred to πi(≻) or the sets of objects that are less preferred to the set of objects allocated via
πi(≻) keeps the outcome unchanged.
Lemma 3. Let π be a strategyproof and non-bossy mechanism, and let ≻,≻′∈ Pn. For all allocations
A ∈ A, if for all i ∈ N, πi(≻) i Ai and πi(≻) ′i Ai, then π(≻) = π(≻
′).
The next lemma states that when all agents’ preferences are identical, any strategyproof, non-bossy,
and Pareto C-efficient mechanism simulates the outcome of a serial dictatorship quota mechanism.
Lemma 4. Let π be a strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto C-efficient mechanism with quota system q,
and ≻ be a preference profile where all individual preferences coincide, that is ≻i=≻j for all i, j ∈ N .
Then, there exists an ordering of agents, f , such that for each k = 1, . . . , |q|, agent fk receives exactly qk
items according to quota q induced by a serial dictatorship.
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Theorem 2. If preferences are lexicographic, an allocation mechanism is strategyproof, non-bossy, neu-
tral, and Pareto C-efficient if and only if it is a serial dictatorship quota mechanism.
Proof. It is clear that in the multiple-assignment problem any serial dictatorship mechanism is strate-
gyproof, neutral, and non-bossy [29]. For Pareto efficiency, in Proposition 2, we showed that the serial
dictatorship mechanism is Pareto C-efficient for any quota, and in fact it becomes Pareto efficient in a
stronger sense when all objects are allocated C = m.
Now, we must show that any strategyproof, Pareto C-efficient, neutral, and non-bossy mechanism, π,
can be simulated via a serial dictatorship quota mechanism. Let π be a strategyproof, Pareto C-efficient,
neutral, and non-bossy mechanism. Consider ≻∈ Pn to be an arbitrary lexicographic preference profile.
Given q, we want to show that π is a serial dictatorship mechanism. Thus, we need to find an ordering
f that induces the same outcome as π when allocating objects serially according to quota q.
Take an identical preference profile and apply the mechanism π with a quota q. By Lemma 4, there
exists a serial dictatorial allocation with an ordering f where agent f1 receives q1 of her favorite objects
fromM , agent f2 receives q2 of her best objects fromM \πf1 , and so on. Therefore, given a strategyproof,
non-bossy, neutral, and Pareto C-efficient mechanism with quota q, we can identify an ordering of agents
f = (f1, . . . , fn) that receive objects according to q = (q1, . . . , qn). Note that since the ordering is fixed
a priori, the same f applies to any non-identical preference profile.
From any arbitrary preference profile ≻, we construct an equivalent profile as follows: Given the
ordering f , the first best q1 objects (the set of size q1) according to ≻f1 are denoted by Af1 and are
listed as the first objects (or set of objects of size q1 since preferences are lexicographic) in ≻′i. The next
q2 objects in ≻′i are the first best q2 objects according to ≻f2 from M \ Af1 , and so on. In general, for
each i = 2, . . . , |q|, the next best qi objects are the best qi objects according to ≻fi from M \
⋃j=i−1
j=1 Aj .
Algorithm 1, which can be found in the Appendix, illustrates these steps.
Now we need to show that applying π to the constructed identical preference profile (≻′) induces
the same outcome as applying it to ≻. By Lemma 2 for each agent fi, πfi(≻) = πfi(≻
′) if for all j < i
we have πfj (≻) = πfj (≻
′). That is, the allocation of an agent remains the same if the allocations of
all previous agents remain unchanged. Now by Lemma 3, for any allocation A ∈ A, if for each agent
i ∈ N , πi(≻′) ′i Ai then we also have πi(≻
′) i Ai. For each fi where i = 1, . . . , |q|, by Lemma 3
since π is strategyproof and non-bossy, for any allocation Afi given the quota q we have πfi 
′
fi
Afi
and πfi fi Afi , which implies that πfi(≻
′) = πfi(≻). Therefore, we have π(≻
′) = π(≻). Since ≻′ is an
identical profile, π(≻′) = π(≻) assigns qi objects to each agent according to the serial ordering f . Thus,
π is a serial dictatorship quota mechanism. ⊓⊔
The following example illustrates how an equivalent preference profile with identical outcome is
constructed given any arbitrary preference profile, ordering, and quota system.
Example 2. Consider allocating 4 objects to 3 agents with preferences illustrated in Table 1 (left), based
on the following quota q = (1, 2, 1). Assume the following ordering of agents f = (1, 2, 3). To construct a
profile with identical orderings, agent 1’s first best object according to ≻1, a, is considered the highest
ranking object in ≻′i. Agent 2’s best two objects (q2 = 2) among the remaining objects c and b are ranked
next, and finally agent 3’s remaining object d is ranked last. Given f and q, the two preference profiles
depicted in Table 1 have exactly similar outcome (shown with squares).
≻1: a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d
≻2: c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d
≻3: a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b
≻′1: a ≻ c ≻ b ≻ d
≻′2: a ≻ c ≻ b ≻ d
≻′3: a ≻ c ≻ b ≻ d
Table 1: Converting a preference profile to identical orderings, with exact same outcome.
Finally, we show that strategyproofness and non-bossiness are necessary and sufficient conditions for
group-strategyproofness.
Proposition 3. A mechanism is group-strategyproof if and only if it is strategyproof and non-bossy.
It is critical to note that a group-strategyproof mechanism does not rule out the possibility of ma-
nipulation by a subset of agents that misreport their preferences and then exchange their allocations ex
post. Consequently, it is easy to see that serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are guaranteed against
group manipulation but do not prevent coalitional manipulation through reallocation [27]. We rewrite
Theorem 2 as the following:
Theorem 3. Serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only neutral, Pareto C-efficient, and group-
strategyproof mechanisms.
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≻1: a ≻ c ≻ b
≻2: c ≻ b ≻ a
≻3: c ≻ a ≻ b
Table 2: An example showing a mechanism that is group-strategyproof but not reallocation-proof.
6 Sequential Dictatorship Quota Mechanisms
In this section, we study a broader class of quota mechanisms by relaxing the neutrality requirement
and allowing for the dictators to be identified in each sequence, as opposed to fixing the dictatorship
orderings apriori.
Proposition 4. A sequential dictatorship quota mechanism is Pareto C-efficient under lexicographic
preferences.
The proof exactly follows as of the proof of Proposition 2. Characterizing the set of strategyproof, non-
bossy, and Pareto C-efficient quota mechanisms is similar to our characterization for serial dictatorship
mechanisms, but requires a subtle change in Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Let π be a strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto C-efficient mechanism with quota q, and ≻
be a preference profile where all individual preferences coincide, that is ≻i=≻j for all i, j ∈ N . Then,
there exists an ordering f1, f2(πf1(≻)), . . . , fk(πf1 (≻), . . . , πfk−1(≻)) such that for each i ∈ N agent i
receives exactly qi items according to quota q.
Theorem 4. An allocation mechanism is strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto C-efficient if and only if
it is a sequential dictatorship quota mechanism.
7 Randomized Quota Mechanisms
So far we identified the class of deterministic strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto C-efficient quota
mechanisms. However, deterministic quota mechanisms generally have poor fairness properties: the first
dictator always has a strong advantage over the next dictator and so on. This unfairness could escalate
when an agent gets to pick more objects than the successor agent, that is, qi > qj for i < j. Thus,
while any profile-independent randomization over a set of serially dictatorial mechanisms still maintains
the incentive property, randomization over priority orderings seem to be a proper way of restoring some
measure of randomized fairness.
We first need to define a few additional properties in the randomized settings. A random allocation is
a stochastic matrix A with
∑
i∈N Ai,j = 1 for each j ∈M . This feasibility condition guarantees that the
probability of assigning each object is a proper probability distribution. Moreover, every random alloca-
tion is a convex combination of deterministic allocations and is induced by a lottery over deterministic
allocations [39]. Hence, we can focus on mechanisms that guarantee Pareto C-efficient solutions ex post.
Definition 6 (Ex Post C-Efficiency). A random allocation is ex post C-efficient if it can be repre-
sented as a probability distribution over deterministic Pareto C-efficient allocations.
The support of any lottery representation of a strategyproof allocation mechanism must consist
entirely of strategyproof deterministic mechanisms. Moreover, if the distribution over orderings does
not depend on the submitted preferences of the agents, then such randomized mechanisms are strate-
gyproof [31].
We focus our attention on the downward lexicographic dominance relation to compare the quality
of two random allocations when preferences are lexicographic.5 Given two allocations, an agent prefers
the one in which there is a higher probability for getting the most-preferred object. Formally, given a
preference ordering ≻i, agent i prefers any allocation Ai that assigns a higher probability to her top
ranked object Ai,o1 over any assignment Bi with Bi,o1 < Ai,o1 , regardless of the assigned probabilities
to all other objects. Only when two assignments allocate the same probability to the top object will the
agent consider the next-ranked object. Throughout this paper we focus on the downward lexicographic
5 In the general domain, this measure corresponds to a stronger notion based on first-order stochastic domi-
nance [4,17]
Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems 9
a b c d
A1 0 1/3 1/2 1/6
A2 1/2 0 0 1/2
A3 0 1/3 1/2 1/6
A4 1/2 1/3 0 1/6
(a) sd-efficient allocation
a b c d
A1 1/12 1/3 5/12 1/6
A2 11/24 0 1/12 11/24
A3 0 5/12 5/12 1/6
A4 11/24 1/4 1/12 5/24
(b) ld-dominated but not sd-dominated
Table 3: An example showing an allocation that is ld-efficient but not sd-efficient.
relation, as opposed to upward lexicographic relation [10]. The downward lexicographic notion compares
random allocations by comparing the probabilities assigned to objects in order of preference. Thus, it is
a more natural way of comparing allocations and has shown to be often used in consumer markets and
other settings involving human decision makers [21, 38, 40].
Definition 7. Agent i with preference ≻i downward lexicographically prefers random allocation Ai to Bi
if
∃ ℓ ∈M : Ai,ℓ > Bi,ℓ ∧ ∀k ≻i ℓ : Ai,k = Bi,k.
We say that allocation A downward lexicographically dominates another allocation B if there
exists no agent i ∈ N that lexicographically prefers Bi to Ai. Thus, an allocation mechanism is downward
lexicographically efficient (ld-efficient) if for all preference profiles its induced allocation is not downward
lexicographically dominated by any other random allocation. We can see that efficiency under general
preferences immediately implies ld-efficiency under lexicographic preferences. However, some allocations
may only guarantee efficiency when preferences are lexicographic.
Example 3. Consider four agents N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four objects M = {a, b, c, d} with quota q =
(1, 1, 1, 1) at the following preference profile ≻= ((cabd), (acdb), (cbda), (acbd)). Note that preferences are
only defined over single objects, and we write (cabd) as a shorthand form of ≻1= c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d. Table 3
shows the stochastic efficient allocation in comparison with ld-efficient allocation. Here, even though the
allocation in Table 3b is ld-dominated by the sd-efficient allocation, it is not stochastically dominated
under the first-order stochastic dominance. This is because agent 2 (similarly agent 4) weakly prefers the
allocation in Table 3b if only considering her first two top objects. Thus, the two random allocations are
in fact incomparable with respect to stochastic dominance.
Given an allocation A, we say that agent i is envious of agent j’s allocation if agent i prefers Aj
to her own allocation Ai. Thus, an allocation is envyfree when no agent is envious of another agent’s
assignment. Formally we write,
Definition 8. Allocation A is envyfree if for all agents i ∈ N , there exists no agent-object pair j ∈ N ,
ℓ ∈M such that,
Aj,ℓ > Ai,ℓ ∧ ∀k ≻i ℓ : Ai,k = Aj,k
A mechanism is envyfree if at all preference profiles ≻∈ Pn it induces an envyfree allocation.
7.1 Random Serial Dictatorship Quota Mechanisms
Recall that |q| denotes the number of agents that are assigned at least one object. Given a quota of
size |q|, there are
(
n
|q|
)
× |q|! permutations (sequences without repetition) of |q| agents from N . Thus, a
Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism with quota q is a uniform randomization over all permutations
of size |q|. Formally,
Definition 9 (Random Serial Dictatorship Quota Mechanism (RSDQ)). Let P(N) be the power
set of N , and f ∈ P(N) be any subset of N . Given a preference profile ≻∈ Pn, a random serial dic-
tatorship with quota q is a convex combination of serial dictatorship quota mechanisms and is defined
as ∑
f∈P(N):|f |=|q| πf (≻)(
n
|q|
)
× |q|!
(1)
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In this randomized mechanism agents are allowed to pick more than one object according to q and not
all the agents may be allocated ex post. We can think of such mechanisms as extending the well-known
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) for the house assignment problem wherein each agent is entitled to
receive exactly one object. Thus, an RSD mechanism is a special case of our quota mechanism with
qi = 1, ∀i ∈ N and |q| = n.
Example 4. Consider three agents and four objects. Agents’ preferences and the probabilistic allocation
induced by RSDQ with quota q = (2, 1, 1) are presented in Table 4. Note that the size of q can potentially
be smaller than the number of agents, meaning that some agents may receive no objects ex post.
≻1 c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d
≻2 a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b
≻3 c ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a
a b c d
A1 3/6 1/6 2/6 2/6
A2 3/6 0 2/6 3/6
A3 0 5/6 2/6 1/6
Table 4: RSDQ allocation with q = (2, 1, 1).
The weakest notion of fairness in randomized settings is the equal treatment of equals. We say an
allocation is fair (in terms of equal treatment of equals) if it assigns an identical random allocation
(lottery) to agents with identical preferences.
Theorem 5. Take any serial dictatorship mechanism π with a quota q. A uniform randomization over
all permutations of orderings with size |q| is strategyproof, ex post C-efficient, and fair (equal treatment
of equals).
Now, we present our main result for envyfreeness of RSDQ regardless of the selected quota system.
Theorem 6. Random Serial Dictatorship Quota mechanism is envyfree with any quota q, under down-
ward lexicographic preferences.
Proof. Let A denote a random allocation induced by RSDQ with quota q at an arbitrary preference
profile ≻∈ Pn. Suppose for contradiction that there exists an agent i ∈ N with random allocation Ai that
prefers another agent’s random allocation Aj to her own assignment, that is, Aj ≻i Ai. Assuming that
preferences are downward lexicographic, there exists an object ℓ such that Aj,ℓ > Ai,ℓ and for all objects
that are ranked higher than ℓ (if any) they both receive the same probability ∀k ≻i ℓ : Ai,k = Aj,k. Thus,
we can write:
∑
x∈Ai:x≻iℓ
Aj,x =
∑
x∈Ai:x≻iℓ
Ai,x. Since preferences are lexicographic, the assignments of
objects less preferred to ℓ become irrelevant because for two allocations Ai and Bi such that Ai,ℓ > Bi,ℓ,
we have Ai ≻i Bi for all x ≺i ℓ where Bi,x ≥ Ai,x. Thus, we need only focus on object ℓ.
Let F denote the set of all orderings of agents where i is ordered before j or i appears but not j.
Note that since we allow for |q| = |f | ≤ n, some agents could be left unassigned, and permuting i and j
could imply that one is not chosen under
(
n
|q|
)
. For any ordering f ∈ F of agents where i precedes j, let
f¯ ∈ F¯ be the ordering obtained from f by swapping i and j. Clearly, |F| = |F¯ | and the union of the two
sets constitute the set of orderings that at least one of i or j (or both) is present. Fixing the preferences,
we can only focus on f and f¯ .
Let πf (≻) be the serial dictatorship with quota q and ordering f at ≻. RSDQ is a convex combination
of such deterministic allocations with equal probability of choosing an ordering from any of F or F¯ .
Given any object y ∈M , either i receives y in πf and j gets y in πf¯ , or none of the two gets y in any
of πf and πf¯ . Thus, object ℓ is either assigned to i in πf and to j in πf¯ , or is assigned to another agent.
If i gets ℓ in πf for all f ∈ F , then j receives ℓ in πf¯ . The contradiction assumption Aj,ℓ > Ai,ℓ implies
that there exists an ordering f where i receives a set of size qi that does not include object ℓ while j’s
allocation set includes ℓ. Let Xi denote this set for agent i and Xj for agent j. Then, Xi ≻i Xj. Thus,
by definition there exists an object ℓ′ ∈ Xi such that ℓ′ ≻i ℓ, where ℓ′ 6∈ Xj . Thus, the probability of
assigning object ℓ′ ≻i ℓ to i is strictly greater than assigning it to j, that is, Ai,ℓ′ > Aj,ℓ′ . However, by
lexicographic assumption we must have ∀k ≻i ℓ : Ai,k = Aj,k, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. Under downward lexicographic preferences, a Random Serial Dictatorship Quota mecha-
nism is ex post C-efficient, strategyproof, and envyfree for any number of agents and objects and any
quota system.
The well-known random serial dictatorship mechanism (RSD), also known as Random Priority, is
defined when n = m and assigns a single object to agents [1]. It is apparent that RSD is a special
instance from the class of RSDQ mechanisms.
Corollary 1. RSD is ex post efficient, strategyproof, and envyfree when preferences are downward lexi-
cographic.
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8 Discussion
We investigated strategyproof allocation mechanisms when agents with lexicographic preferences may
receive more than one object according to a quota. The class of sequential quota mechanisms enables
the social planner to choose any quota without any limitations. For the general domain of preferences,
however, the class of strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto efficient mechanisms is restricted to sequential
dictatorships with equal quota sizes. Demanding neutrality, the set of such mechanisms gets restricted
to quasi-dictatorial mechanisms, which are far more unfair [28,29]. Thus, such mechanisms limit a social
planner to specific quota systems while demanding the complete allocation of all available objects.
We showed that the class of strategyproof allocation mechanisms that satisfy neutrality, Pareto C-
efficiency, and non-bossiness expands significantly when preferences are lexicographic. Our characteriza-
tion shows that serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying these properties
in the multiple-assignment problem. Removing the neutrality requirement, this class of mechanisms fur-
ther expands to sequential dictatorship quota mechanisms.
To recover some level of fairness, we extended the serial dictatorship quota mechanisms to randomized
settings and showed that randomization can help achieve some level of stochastic symmetry amongst
the agents. More importantly, we showed that RSDQ mechanisms satisfy strategyproofness, ex post
C-efficiency, and envyfreeness for any number of agents, objects, and quota systems when preferences
are downward lexicographic. The envyfreeness result is noteworthy: it shows that in contrast to the
Probabilistic Serial rule (PS) [4] which satisfies strategyproofness when preferences are lexicographic
only when n ≥ m [34], the well-known RSD mechanism in the standard assignment problem is envyfree
for any combination of n and m. These results address the two open questions about the existence of a
mechanism with more favorable fairness and strategyproofness properties [28, 34].
Serial dictatorship mechanisms are widely used in practice since they are easy to implement while
providing stability and strategyproofness guarantees [30]. Serial dictatorship quota mechanisms and their
randomized counterparts provide a richer framework for multiple allocation problems while creating the
possibility of fair and envyfree assignments. Our characterization for deterministic quota mechanisms
when preferences are lexicographic justifies the use of quotas in sequential settings. In randomized set-
tings, however, an open question is whether RSDQ mechanisms are the only allocation rules that satisfy
the above properties in the multiple assignment domain. Of course, answering this question, first, requires
addressing the open question by Bade [3] in the standard assignment problem (where every agent gets
at most one object): is random serial dictatorship a unique mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness,
ex post efficiency, and equal treatment of equals?
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A Missing Proofs and Algorithms
In this appendix we include all proofs that were missing in the main part of the paper, along with the
pseudocode used to construct particular preference profiles that are needed in some of the proofs.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The proof follows by constructing a manipulable preference profile. Given any Pareto C-efficient
and non-bossy interleaving mechanism, we show that we can construct an instance (preference profile)
at which at least one agent can manipulate the outcome.
Suppose there is a non-bossy and Pareto C-efficient mechanism π with at least one alternation between
agents i and j. Note that the alternation could be through a fixed ordering or through a picking process.
Since we are constructing an instance, we can assume that all other agents k ∈ N \ {i, j} will receive
their objects after agents i and j (or have already received their non-conflicting objects before the two).
We now construct a preference profile such that ≻= (≻i,≻j,≻N\{i,j}).
Let fk denote the agent in the kth picking order, that is, f2 = i indicates that the agent in the second
picking order is agent i. Consider the ordering such that for agents 1 and 2 we have f1 = f3 = 1 and
f2 = 2. Assume there are 3 objects available and construct a preference profile as follows: ≻1= a ≻ b ≻ c
and ≻2= o1 ≻ o2 ≻ o3, where ok represent the kth ranked object in ≻2. By Pareto C-efficiency and
non-bossiness of π, agents final allocations must preclude any further exchange between the two agents,
and no agent can change the allocation of the other while its own allocation remains unchanged.
Since agent 1 picks first and last according to ordering f , agent 1 can pick her first choice either at
stage 1 or 3 as long as agent 2’s top choice is not equal to that of agent 1, i.e. o1 ∈ {b, c}. If o1 = c then
there is no conflict between agent 1 and 2 and playing truthfully has the best outcome for agent 1. Thus,
it follows that o1 = b and o2 ∈ {a, c}. Now we need to construct the rest of agent 2’s ordering such that
agent 1’s top choice, object a, remains in the pool of objects until the last stage. Thus, for the following
profile ≻1= a ≻ b ≻ c and ≻2= b ≻ c ≻ a, the interleaving mechanism is manipulable. This implies that
no Pareto C-efficient and non-bossy interleaving mechanism guarantees strategyproofness. ⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We provide proof for each of the statements in the lexicographic domain.
– Since Bi ⊂ Ai then all objects in Bi are also in Ai, and there exists an object x ∈ Ai such that
x /∈ Bi. By the definition of lexicographic preferences, having an object is preferred to not having
the object (i.e. objects are goods). Therefore, Ai ≻i Bi.
– It is easy to see that adding a set of object X ∩Ai = ∅ to two sets such that Ai ≻i Bi maintains the
preference over the two sets. This is because elements in X are added to both sets and by assumption
there is still an element x ∈ Ai and x /∈ X that is preferred to all objects in Bi. We should prove
the converse that if Ai ∪ X ≻i Bi ∪ X then Ai ≻i Bi. Suppose not, that is Bi i Ai. By adding
X = Bi −Ai to both sides we have Bi ∪X i Ai ∪X , that is, Bi i Ai ∪Bi, which contradicts the
strong monotonicity of lexicographic preferences when Ai is nonempty.
– Suppose that there does not exist an object x ∈ Ai such that x ≻i X for all X ∈ P(Bi − Ai). The
set X can be any power set of Bi −Ai, and for the sake of this proof we assume that X = Bi −Ai.
By the second statement in this lemma, for Ai ≻i Bi, we can add any X such that X ∩ Ai = ∅ to
the both sides and write Ai ∪X ≻i Bi ∪X , which holds since X = Bi −Ai. This states that for any
object x ∈ Bi, x is also a member of Ai ∪ X , implying that Bi ⊂ Ai ∪ X . Note that Bi 6= Ai ∪ X
because Ai is considered to be nonempty. Using the first statement in this lemma, if Bi ⊂ Ai ∪ X
then Ai ∪X ≻i Bi. Replacing X with Bi −Ai and subtracting it from both sides, we have Ai ≻i ∅,
which implies that there exists an object x ∈ Ai such that x /∈ Bi and x ≻i Bi − Ai, contradicting
the initial assumption.
The above items conclude our proof for the statements in this lemma. ⊓⊔
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For all j < i we have πfj (≻) = πfj (≻
′). By non-bossiness and strategyproofness, for all ≻′j such
that πj(≻) = πj(≻′j ,≻−j) we have π(≻) = π(≻
′
j ,≻−j). In words, non-bossiness and strategyproofness
prevent any agent to change the allocation of other agents with lower priority (those who are ordered
14 Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson
after him), without changing its own allocation. Let M ′ be the set of remaining objects such that
M ′ = M \
⋃j
k=1 πfk(≻). Since πfj (≻) = πfj (≻
′), the set of remaining objects M ′ under ≻′ is equivalent
to those under ≻, implying that πfi(≻) = πfi(≻
′) which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The proof follows similar to Lemma 1 in [37]. First, we show that π(≻′i,≻−i) = π(≻), that is
changing i’s preference only does not affect the outcome. From strategyproofness we know that πi(≻i
) i πi(≻′i,≻−i). By the lemma’s assumption (if condition) we can also write πi(≻i) 
′
i πi(≻
′
i,≻−i).
However, strategyproofness implies that πi(≻′i,≻−i) 
′
i πi(≻i). Since the preferences are strict, the only
way for the above inequalities to hold is when πi(≻′i,≻−i) = πi(≻). The non-bossiness of π implies that
π(≻′i,≻−i) = π(≻).
We need to show that the following argument holds for all agents. We do this by partitioning the
preference profile into arbitrary partitions constructed partly from ≻ and partly from ≻′. Let ≻p=
(≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
p−1,≻p, . . . ,≻n) ∈ P
n. Thus, a sequence of preference profiles can be recursively written as
≻p+1= (≻′p,≻
p
−p). Using the first part of the proof and by the recursive representation, we can write
π(≻p) = π(≻′p,≻
p
−p) = π(≻
p+1). Now using this representation, we shall write π(≻′) = π(≻n+1) and
π(≻) = π(≻1), which implies that π(≻) = π(≻′). ⊓⊔
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose the contrary and let ≻ be an identical preference profile ≻1=≻2= a ≻ b ≻ c such that
agent 1 receives a and c while agent 2 receives b. For agents 1 and 2, assume that they both have
received no other objects except the ones stated above (Alternatively, we can assume that the other
objects received by these two agents so far are their highest ranked objects, and because these objects
were assigned in some previous steps, they won’t affect the assignment of the remaining objects). For
all other agents N \ {1, 2} assume that the allocation remains unchanged, i.e., these agents will receive
exactly the same objects after we change the preferences of agent 1. By Lemma 3, since the mechanism
is non-bossy and strategyproof, agent 1’s allocation remains unchanged under the following changes in
its preference ordering:
≻1= a ≻ b ≻ c⇒ a ≻ c ≻ b⇒ c ≻ a ≻ b
Thus, the new preference profile ≻′ would be
≻′1: c ≻ a ≻ b
≻2: a ≻ b ≻ c
where π(≻′) = π(≻). The squares show the current allocation. Since agent 1 is receiving two objects and
agent 2 receives one, for any ordering that is not prescribed by a serial dictatorship, agent 2 should be
ordered second (otherwise, the ordering is a serial dictatorship).
More specifically, orderings (1,2) and (2,1) are serial dictatorships. Since agent 2 must be ordered
second, it must be the case that agent 1 goes first and third (otherwise we are back at (1,2), which
results in a serial dictatorship). Agent 1 first chooses object c according to ≻′1, then agent 2 chooses
object a according to ≻2, and lastly agent 1 chooses the remaining object b. Therefore, agent 2 can
benefit from manipulating the mechanism by choosing a instead of b, contradicting the assumption that
π is strategyproof and non-bossy. This implies that such agents cannot exist, and concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
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A.6 Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1: Constructing an identical preference profile
Data: A preference profile ≻, an ordering f , and quota q
Result: A profile with identical preferences ≻′ with π(≻′) = π(≻)
1 Initialize ≻1← ∅
2 Initialize set Z = ∅
3 for (i← 1 to |q|) do
4 Z ← top(qi,≻fi) // Most preferred set of size qi from the remaining objects.
5 ≻′1← append(≻
′
1, Z) // Append this set to the preference ordering.
6 Z ← ∅
7 for (i← 1 to |f |) do
8 ≻′i←≻
′
1
9 return ≻′.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It is easy to see that group-strategyproofness implies strategyproofness and non-bossiness. We
need to show the converse, that is, if π is strategyproof and non-bossy then it is group-strategyproof.6
Let N ′ ⊆ N be a subset of agents, N ′ = {1, . . . , n′}, with ≻′N ′ such that allocation of some agents
in N ′ strictly improves while for other agents in N ′ the allocation remains the same. Formally, for all
i ∈ N ′, πi(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′) i πi(≻) and for some j ∈ N
′, πj(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′) ≻j πj(≻). Construct an alternative
preference profile ≻ˆ such that for all i ∈ N ′ the preference ordering ≻ˆi preserves the ordering but moves
the set πi(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′) to the first rank in the ordering.
For agent 1, if π1(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′) ≻1 π1(≻) then by Lemma 2, π1(≻
′
N ′ ,≻−N ′) is not in the list of available
sets. Otherwise, π1(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′) = π1(≻). Thus, strategyproofness implies that π1(≻ˆ1,≻−1) = π1(≻),
and by non-bossiness we have π(≻ˆ1,≻−1) = π(≻). Repeating the same argument for all other agents in
{2, . . . , n′}, we get π(≻ˆN ′ ,≻−N ′) = π(≻). Now since π is strategyproof and non-bossy, using Lemma 3
we have that π(≻ˆN ′ ,≻−N ′) = π(≻′N ′ ,≻−N ′). This implies that π(≻N ′ ,≻−N ′) = π(≻), meaning that π
is group-strategyproof. ⊓⊔
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Let π be a strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto C-efficient mechanism with quota q. By Lemma 4,
we know that for each identical preference profile, there exists a fixed ordering f ′ : (f ′1, . . . , f
′
k) such that
agent f ′1 receives q1 objects, agent f
′
2 receives q2, and so on. Let f be a dictatorship ordering such
that f1, f2(πf1(≻)), . . . , fk(πf1(≻), . . . , πfk−1(≻)). We show that for each ordering of agents, there is an
exact mapping from f ′ to f . For all preference profiles, map each agent ordering as follows: f1 = f
′
1,
f2(πf1(≻)) = f
′
2, . . ., fk(πf1 (≻), . . . , πfk−1(≻) = f
′
k. This implies that f is a dictatorial ordering, which
concludes our existence proof. ⊓⊔
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Sequential dictatorship quota mechanisms are strategyproof and non-bossy. Proposition 4 states
that when preferences are lexicographic sequential dictatorships are Pareto C-efficient. Sequential dicta-
torships are also Pareto efficient when C =
∑|q|
i=1 qi.
We must show the converse. Let π be a strategyproof, Pareto C-efficient, and non-bossy mechanism
with quota q. By Lemma 5, given an identical preference profile and a quota q, there exists a sequential
ordering f where agent f1 receives q1 of her favorite objects from M , agent f2(πf1(≻)) receives q2 of her
best objects from M \ πf1 , and so on. Therefore, since the choice of the first dictator is independent of
preference profile, we can identify a sequential ordering f1, f2(πf1 (≻)), . . . , fk(πf1 (≻), . . . , πfk−1 (≻)) that
receive objects according to q = (q1, . . . , qk).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we construct an alternate preference profile ≻′, based on the given
preference profile, at which all agents have identical preferences, where ≻′= (≻′i, . . . ,≻
′
i).
6 The proof is inspired by Lemma 1 in [27] for single-object allocation and extends the agent allocations to sets
of objects.
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According to function f , the first best q1 objects according to ≻f1 are denoted by πf1(≻) and are
listed as the first objects in ≻′i. The next q2 objects in ≻
′
2 are the first best q2 objects according to
≻f2(πf1 (≻)) from M \ πf1(≻), and so on. In general, for each i ∈ N \ f1, the next best qi objects are the
best qi objects according to ≻fi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻)) from M \
⋃j=i−1
j=1 πfj (≻). These steps are depicted in
Algorithm 2.
By Lemma 2, for any agent in f the outcome of π(≻′) must remain unchanged if the outcome of all
predecessor agents remains unchanged. Thus, by Lemma 3, for any allocation A ∈ A, if for each agent
i ∈ N , πi(≻′) ′i Ai then we also have πi(≻
′) i Ai. For each fi(·) where i = 1, . . . , |f |, by Lemma 3
since π is strategyproof and non-bossy, for any allocation Afi given the quota q we have
πfi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻)) 
′
fi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻))
Afi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻))
πfi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻)) fi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻)) Afi(πf1 (≻),...,πfi−1 (≻))
which implies that π(≻′) = π(≻). Therefore, we identified an sequential ordering of agents that induces
the same outcome as the original mechanism. Thus, π is a sequential dictatorship quota mechanism. ⊓⊔
Algorithm 2: Constructing an identical preference profile
Data: A preference profile ≻, first dictator f1, and quota q
Result: A profile with identical preferences ≻′ with pi(≻′) = pi(≻)
1 Initialize ≻1← ∅
2 Initialize set Z = ∅
3 for (i← 1 to |q|) do
4 if (i = 1) then
5 k ← f1 // The first dictator is known.
6 else
7 k ← fi(pif1(≻), . . . , pifi−1(≻)) // Identify the next dictator
8 Z ← top(qi,≻k) // Most preferred set of size qi from the remaining objects.
9 ≻′1← append(≻
′
1, Z) // Append this set to the preference ordering.
10 Z ← ∅
11 for (i← 1 to |f |) do
12 ≻′i←≻
′
1
13 return ≻′.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Showing ex post C-efficiency is simple: any serial dictatorship mechanism satisfies Pareto C-
efficiency, and thus, any randomization also guarantees a Pareto C-efficient solution ex post. The support
of the random allocation consists of only strategyproof deterministic allocations, implying that the ran-
domization is also strategyproof. The equal treatment of equal is the direct consequence of the uniform
randomization over the set of possible priority orderings. ⊓⊔
A.11 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The conventional RSD mechanism is equivalent to an RSDQ mechanism where agents receive
exactly one object, that is,
∑
i qi = m and for each agent i, qi = 1. Therefore, RSD satisfies ex post
efficiency, strategyproofness, and envyfreeness. ⊓⊔
